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Abstract
This article presents a review of recent studies that estimate the trade effects of foreign aid. It also provides new results
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countries and 125 recipient countries over the period 1995 to 2016. In a second step, the indirect effect of aid on income
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1. Introduction
Rich countries have traditionally used foreign aid as a
means of advancing their foreign policy aims in develop-
ing countries. Although each donor country has its own
policies concerning aid distribution, donors tend to give
bilateral aid to countries with which they have past or
current colonial links, to countries that have the same
official language and to those with which they have cul-
tural and historical links (Nilsson, 1997). Political and eco-
nomic interests have also influenced donors’ aid policies
and in many cases these strategic interests have been re-
lated to commercial aims (Arvin & Baum, 1997).
Over the years, the link between foreign aid and
trade has generated significant academic interest and
has been analyzed in a number of different contexts
(Cadot, Fernandes, Gourdon, Matto, & de Melo, 2014).
In general, the existing literature points towards a posi-
tive relationship between trade and foreign aid; this re-
lationship is robust to various controls in the case of re-
cipient imports, but not in the case of recipient exports
(Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, & Klasen, 2014;
Nowak-Lehmann, Martínez-Zarzoso, Herzer, Klasen, &
Cardozo, 2013; Wagner, 2003; Pettersson & Johansson,
2013; Silva & Nelson, 2012). Most related studies focus
on foreign aid and its link with trade, but do not address
the link with bilateral or regional trade policies; there is
thus scope for investigating the latter association. There-
fore, this article, after presenting a review of recent stud-
ies that estimate the trade effects of foreign aid, exam-
ines the extent to which aid policies help promote re-
cipient countries’ imports from and exports to donors,
thereby contributing to the development process. More-
over, it examines whether bilateral aid and trade poli-
cies are complementary and explores the indirect effects
that aid exerts on economic development through trade.
This article makes two novel contributions with respect
to the previous literature, which has mainly focused on
the trade-aid nexus (Nowak-Lehmann,Martínez-Zarzoso,
Herzer, Klasen, & Cardozo, 2013; Martínez-Zarzoso et al.,
2014). First, in addition to the aid-trade link, it explores
the interaction between trade agreements and bilateral
aid. To that end, this article estimates a gravity model of
trade using data for a 22-year period and for trade be-
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tween developed and developing countries, augmented
with the interaction between bilateral aid and free trade
agreements (FTAs). Second, it estimates and discusses
the effect of aid on developing countries’ total exports,
and presents estimates of the indirect effects that aid ex-
erts on income through international trade.
The main results indicate that bilateral aid has a di-
rect effect on donor exports and an indirect positive ef-
fect on the income levels in the recipient countries. With
respect to FTAs, the results indicate that the direct effect
of aid on donor exports is mainly observed for recipient
countries that do not have an FTA with the donor.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents a summary of the related literature. Sec-
tion 3 presents the main empirical strategy used to eval-
uate the links between foreign aid and donor exports, re-
cipient exports, FTAs and, in turn, recipient output. Sec-
tion 4 discusses themain results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
This section reviews the recent literature on the link be-
tween development aid, international trade and FTAs.
There are several channels through which foreign aid
can foster exports from donors to recipients at the bilat-
eral level: First, donors can use foreign aid as an ‘opening-
door policy’ to establish or reinforce official relationships
and to present the country as a trustworthy exporter.
Second, when a donor gives aid for trade that is dedi-
cated to infrastructure, to enhancing production capacity
or to trade facilitation in general, these measures should
reduce trade costs and hence boost exports. Third, un-
der the premise that aid promotes trade, and trade influ-
ences income, aid can be seen as having an indirect ef-
fect on income. Tied aid has also been used to promote
donor exports by linking the transfer to the purchase of
goods and services from the donor (Arvin & Baum, 1997;
Arvin & Choudhry, 1997). Finally, a long-term aid rela-
tionship can foster goodwill towards the donor, incen-
tivizing firms in the recipient country to buy goods from
the donor country (Arvin & Baum, 1997).
Recipient countries perceive aid as additional income
that will eventually lead to an increase in demand and in
imports (Temple & Van de Sijpe, 2017). For instance, de-
velopment aid can be used to overcome financing con-
straints (Chenery & Strout, 1966). Aid transfers might
also affect the recipient country’s income in the medium
to long term. In particular, private domestic savings could
be substituted by external savings that come in the
form of foreign aid (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2006, 2008;
Griffin & Enos, 1970; Griffin & Enos, 1970; White, 1992).
Development aid could also be used by political lead-
ers to substitute public revenue with external savings,
in order to gain voter support (Crivelli & Gupta, 2017;
Morrisey, 2001, 2005; White, 1992; among others).
Turning to the empirics, the gravity model of trade
provides a suitable theoretical framework to evaluate
the determinants of bilateral trade and,more specifically,
to evaluate the trade-aid relationship. First used to esti-
mate the determinants of bilateral trade by Tinbergen
(1962), this model holds that bilateral trade is directly
proportional to the Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) of
the trading countries and inversely proportional to the
distance between them. The model has been widely
used in the empirical trade literature to estimate the
effect of a number of trade policies on bilateral trade.
Starting with Anderson (1979), the theoretical literature
has shown that gravity models can be derived from
a range of trade theories (Anderson & van Wincoop,
2003; Bergstrand, 1985, 1989; Head & Mayer, 2014).
This model is today considered a workhorse for empir-
ical analysis of the international trade effects of policy
measures, such as trade agreements, trade facilitation
initiatives, tariff and non-tariff barriers reductions, etc.
Head and Mayer (2014) summarize the recent literature
and state that the estimation of theoretically-based grav-
ity models requires the inclusion of proxies for the rel-
ative trade costs between a given country and its po-
tential trading partners—the so-called multilateral resis-
tance terms (MRT). The research that uses the gravity
model to examine the effect of development aid on trade
is summarized below. Other modeling frameworks have
already been reviewed in Zarin-Nejadan, Monteiro and
Noormamode, (2008, Table 3.1).
Jepma (1991), Arvin and Baum (1997) and Arvin and
Choudhry (1997) analyzed the relationship between bi-
lateral aid and bilateral exports, distinguishing between
tied and untied aid, and found that both have a similar
effect on promoting exports. In more recent years, there
has been a gradual reduction in the tying of aid, partly
due to pressure from the Development Assistance Com-
mittee of the OECD (OECD-DAC).
Nilsson (1997) was the first author to use the grav-
ity model framework to investigate the relationship be-
tween bilateral aid and EU exports to developing coun-
tries. Estimating the traditional gravity model with data
from 1975 to 1992, he showed that US$1 of aid in-
creased EU exports by an average of US$2.60. Other
authors have found similar effects for other countries
(Pettersson & Johansson, 2013; Silva & Nelson, 2012;
Wagner, 2003), while smaller effects have been found
when applying panel data techniques and estimating a
theoretically-based gravity model that accounts for MRT
(Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2014; Nowak-Lehmann et al.,
2013; Silva & Nelson, 2012). Silva and Nelson (2012)
used the bonus vetus OLS method proposed by Baier
and Bergstrand (2009) to model multilateral resistance.
Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2014) investigated whether bi-
lateral aid promoted bilateral exports to recipient coun-
tries during the period 1988–2007. The authors ap-
plied advanced panel data techniques considering time-
variant MRT and endogeneity controls, and providing
donor-specific export/aid elasticities. Overall, the find-
ings showed a positive effect of bilateral aid on exports,
which varied over time and across donors, and which de-
pended on the extent towhich donors tied aid to exports.
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The effect appeared to have decreased substantially over
the period of study and was no longer statistically signifi-
cant by the 2000s, indicating that donors had responded
to the OECD-DAC’s recommendations concerning the un-
tying of aid. Pettersson and Johansson (2013) used bilat-
eral exports between 180 countries to investigate third-
country effects and the effects of aid on recipient exports,
but did not control for the endogeneity of the aid vari-
able and for time-varying MRT.
Examples of single-donor studies are Martínez-
Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, Klasen and Larch (2009),
Nowak-Lehmann, Martínez-Zarzoso, Klasen, and Herzer
(2009) and Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, Klasen
and Johannsen (2016) for Germany; Hansen and Rand
(2014) for Denmark; Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann
and Klasen (2017) for the Netherlands; Zarin-Nejadan
et al. (2008) for Switzerland; Otor (2017) for Japan; and
Liu and Tang (2018) for China and the US. The main re-
sults obtained in those studies are summarized in Ta-
ble A.1 in the Appendix, which is a more up-to-date and
comprehensive version of Table 1 in Hansen and Rand
(2014, p. 19).
A few of the abovementioned articles disaggregated
exports in some way (Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2013;
Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, & Klasen, 2017;
Pettersson & Johansson, 2013). The findings indicated
that the effects of aid on trade also differ by sector and
seem to be more pronounced in sectors where the ex-
porter has a comparative advantage.
Regarding the effect of aid on recipient exports, thus
far only Pettersson and Johansson (2013) and Nowak-
Lehmann et al. (2013) have investigated this effect. The
first study found a positive and significant effect of aid
on recipient exports, whereas the second found that the
long-term impact of bilateral aid on recipient exports
is not statistically significant. Pettersson and Johansson
(2013) did not use bilateral fixed effects, which capture
time-invariant pair heterogeneity, and reported that us-
ing bilateral fixed effects instead of country dummies
yieldedmuchweaker though still significant effects of aid.
The use of a full gravity model (Silva & Nelson, 2012)
rather than just donor-recipient trade flows (Martínez-
Zarzoso et al., 2014) to study the effects of bilateral aid
on trade does not significantly change the results of the
export/aid elasticity. Moreover, the results appear to be
only slightly affected by not including zero trade or zero
aid flows in the estimations. Notably, the way in which
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is controlled
for in the models seems to be the main source of differ-
ences in the results. In fact, the inclusion of trading-pair
fixed effects (FE) to control for this type of endogeneity
weakens the relationship between aid and recipient ex-
ports, but not the one between aid and donor exports.
In the last decade, more attention has been given
to how aid can be used to promote exports from de-
veloping countries—the so-called ‘aid for trade’ princi-
ple (Morrisey, 2006). Aid for trade research has been
at the forefront of the trade-and-aid literature since the
mid-2000s, with most such studies using aid for trade
data to investigate the effect of aid on recipient exports.
Cadot et al. (2014) presents a summary of this growing
literature, the main findings of which are mixed. For in-
stance, this literature reports small effects of aid on trade
for recipient countries that receive specific types of aid,
mainly aid assigned to economic infrastructure or aid
for building production capacity; moreover, these effects
are found only for medium to large exporters (Martínez-
Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, & Rehwald, 2017).
The bilateral relationship between donor and recipi-
ent countries could also be used to promote FTAs. FTAs
can reduce or eliminate artificial trade barriers between
member countries, particularly tariffs and non-tariff bar-
riers. Since the 1970s,most aid recipients have benefited
from lower tariffs due to their Most Favored Nation sta-
tus and their participation in the Generalized System of
Preferences; however, these trade preferences are non-
reciprocal and apply only to exports but not imports of
capital goods. Moreover, there are other ways, besides
the elimination of tariffs, in which being a signatory to a
trade agreement can stimulate trade. FTAs and Customs
Unions (CUs) are of particular interest in this regard, be-
cause they eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers be-
tween members and resolve uncertainty with respect to
trade preferences. The difference between an FTA and
a CU is that in the former members maintain their own
trade policies with respect to third countries, whereas in
the latter the members have a common external policy.
For this reason, FTAmember exportersmust complywith
the rules of origin for goods that originate in third coun-
tries and are in turn traded within the area.
Some donors have common external policies that
simultaneously incorporate bilateral trade and aid poli-
cies, and treat them as complementary. In some cases,
donors give aid to countries with which they have weak
trade links, with the aim of establishing closer relations.
The nexus between giving aid and forming FTAs has
only been investigated in specific contexts, namely in
the aid for trade literature (Vijil, 2014) and in research
on trade flows between EU and North African coun-
tries (Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, & Johannsen,
2012). Vijil (2014) found complementarities between
aid for trade and regional economic integration, while
Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2012) found that both aid and
FTA/CU agreements promote trade in North African coun-
tries, and that the twomeasures complement each other.
In this article, we extend this literature by focusing on
North-South bilateral aid and regional trade agreements
(RTAs), including FTAs and CUs, to investigate whether
the complementarities found in previous literature are
more generally applicable.
Finally, it should be noted that the body of research
on the effect of trade and foreign aid on economic
growth and economic development is very large, and a
comprehensive review of the entire literature is beyond
the scope of this article. Therefore, the main arguments
are outlined here and a number of highly influential ar-
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ticles are highlighted. This literature has followed two
parallel paths. On the one hand, authors that have fo-
cused on the effect of openness on economic growth
have tended not to include foreign aid in the growth re-
gressions (Alcalá & Ciccone, 2004; Dollar & Kraay, 2003;
Frankel & Romer, 1999; Singh, 2010, for a review, among
others). On the other hand, a number of articles inves-
tigating the effect of foreign aid on economic growth
have included openness as a control and in many cases
as part of an index that included several policy variables
(Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Collier & Dollar, 2001; Dalgaard
& Hansen, 2000). We refer readers to Addison, Morrisey
and Tarp (2017) for an overview of the macroeconomics
of aid, in which they describe five generations of aid re-
search and the main controversies surrounding the aid-
growth debate. Starting in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
the aid and growth literature mostly focused on analyz-
ingwhether aidwas effective only when accompanied by
a number of “good” economic policies in the recipient
countries—the so-called conditionality argument. After
the seminal article by Burnside and Dollar (2000), many
scholars focused on validating the findings of that re-
search, obtainingmixed evidence at best, as summarized
in McGillivray, Feeny and Hermes and Lensink (2006, Ta-
ble A.2). In the 2010s, research showed that despite the
shortcomings and complexities involved in the develop-
ment aid process, foreign aid has been effective when an
extended time frame is considered (Arndt, Jones, & Tarp,
2010, 2015, 2016).
For a more in-depth discussion of the aid-growth
debate in recent decades, we refer readers to Hansen
and Tarp (2000, 2001) and to the literature reviews
in Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), Doucouliagos
and Paldam (2008, 2015), Edwards (2005); Rajan and
Subramanian (2008) and Arndt et al. (2015, 2016).
3. Empirical Strategy
This section describes the data, sources and variables
and presents the main results concerning the bilateral
trade and aid link, the complementarity of aid and trade
policies, aswell as the links between aid and total exports
from recipients to donors and between aid and recipi-
ents’ income level.
3.1. Data, Sources and Variables
The data and variables used cover the period 1995 to
2016 for a cross-section of 33 donors and 125 recipi-
ents (see Table A.2 for a list of variables and sources
and Table A.3 for a list of countries). Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) data are from theOECD1.We con-
sider net ODA disbursements, in current USD, because
we are interested in the funds that were actually dis-
bursed to the recipient countries in a given year. Dis-
bursements record the actual international transfer of fi-
nancial resources, or the transfer of goods or services,
valued at the cost to the donor. Aid commitments are
also used as proxies for the willingness to give aid. Bi-
lateral exports are obtained from the UN-COMTRADE
database2. Data on income and population variables
are drawn from The World Bank (World Development
Indicators Database, WDI-2018). Gravity variables such
as distance between capital cities, common language,
colonial relationship and common border are from the
Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Interna-
tionales (CEPII). The variable RTA and currency unions
are constructed from De Sousa (2012) and updated us-
ing data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
Central Banks.
The additional variables used in the aggregate ex-
ports and income models—namely, population, con-
sumer price index, gross capital formation, foreign di-
rect investment and remittances—are also from the
WDI-2018. Summary statistics of the main variables are
presented in Table 1.
3.2. Model Specification
The main modeling framework is the gravity model of
trade, and in this context we use a control function ap-
proach to investigate the effect of aid on donor and
recipient exports. This approach shares some features
with the standard approaches based on Instrumental
Variables (IV), which are also used as robustness checks.
Most of the panel data applications we reviewed used
models that are linear in the parameters (log-linearized
version of the gravity model) and were estimated using
IV methods with two-stage least squares (2SLS), General-
ized Methods of Moments (GMM) or dynamic Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) to account for the endogeneity of the
aid variable. The control function approach is an alter-
native proposed by Wooldridge (2010), which relies on
similar identification conditions to the IV approach. The
main advantage of the control function approach is that,
unlike IV methods, it can be used in combination with
the most recent techniques proposed to estimate grav-
ity models of trade with panel data, which require the
inclusion of three sets of multidimensional fixed effects
(Correia, 2017).
In our specification, exports from country i to coun-
try j at year t in natural logs (lxijt) is the response vari-
able, bilateral aid in natural logs from country i to coun-
try j (laidijt) is the endogenous explanatory variable and
Z is the 1× L vector of exogenous variables (Z1 is a 1× L1
strict sub-vector of Z). This can be specified as:
lxijt = Z1𝛿1+𝛼1laidijt+uijt, (1)
1 The countries selected are all those for which the OECD-DAC reports data on ODA, andwhich have been giving aid over the analyzed period. All recipient
countries in the sample engage in bilateral trade with the donors although there are 3,815 non-reported data on exports, which could be potential zero
trade flows. Those represent only 10 percent of the observations used in the regressions.
2 UN-COMTRADE has incomplete data for 2017 as some countries report with a lag of 2 years. For this reason our sample ends in 2016.
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Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Recipient Exports*:
Lexp 35,710 9.143 3.547 −5.521 19.517
Laid 35,710 0.717 2.492 −4.605 9.326
Laidcom 35,710 0.654 2.603 −4.605 9.186
Lgdp_don 33,849 27.328 1.397 23.376 30.523
Lgdp_rec 32,947 23.381 1.888 16.395 28.592
WTO 35,710 0.7541 0.4306 0 1
Comcur 35,710 0.0021 0.0458 0 1
Ldist 35,710 8.7478 0.6231 4.710 9.846
Landlock 35,710 0.4112 0.5659 0 2
Lang 35,710 0.1642 0.3704 0 1
Comcol 35,710 0.0075 0.0861 0 1
Border 35,710 0.0032 0.0567 0 1
Smctry 35,710 0.0016 0.0399 0 1
RTA 35,710 0.116 0.320 0 1
RTA_Europe 35,710 0.096 0.294 0 1
RTA_Asia 35,710 0.004 0.059 0 1
RTA_Africa 35,710 0.002 0.047 0 1
RTA_America 35,710 0.010 0.098 0 1
RTA_Pacific 35,710 0.001 0.030 0 1
Donor Exports**:
Lexp 37,356 10.051 2.670 −5.809 19.093
Laid 37,356 0.621 2.519 −4.605 9.326
Laidcom 37,314 0.556 2.611 −4.605 9.186
Lgdp_don 35,457 27.308 1.405 23.376 30.523
Lgdp_rec 34,590 23.341 1.881 16.395 28.592
WTO 37,356 0.770 0.421 0 1
Comcur 37,356 0.002 0.045 0 1
Ldist 37,356 8.754 0.617 4.7104 9.850
Landlock 37,356 0.398 0.561 0 2
Lang 37,356 0.168 0.374 0 1
Comcol 37,356 0.008 0.088 0 1
Border 37,356 0.003 0.056 0 1
Smctry 37,356 0.002 0.039 0 1
RTA 37,356 0.114 0.318 0 1
RTA_Europe 37,356 0.091 0.288 0 1
RTA_Asia 37,356 0.003 0.058 0 1
RTA_Africa 37,356 0.002 0.047 0 1
RTA_America 37,356 0.013 0.112 0 1
RTA_Pacific 37,356 0.001 0.030 0 1
Notes: * Dataset used in Tables 2 and A.5 and first part of Tables A.7 and A.8. ** Dataset used in Tables 3 and A.6 and second part of
Tables A.7 and A.8. L denotes natural logs.
where aid denotes net bilateral official development
aid (disbursements). The Z1 variables are the natural
logs of GDPs for the donor and recipient countries as
well as the standard gravity variables; namely, distance
between trading countries and dummy variables for
common language, past or current colonial relationship
and RTA (we omit subscripts for simplicity). In the pre-
ferred panel data specification, the effect of the bilateral
time-invariant gravity variables will be subsumed in the
dyadic fixed effects and the effect of GDPs on the time-
variant MRT.
First, consider the exogeneity assumption:
E(Z′1uijt) = 0. (2)
The reduced form for laid is:
laidijt = Z𝜋2+𝜀ijt, (3)
where Z includes (in addition to the exogenous vari-
ables in Z1) aid commitments (aid commitments were
lagged two periods to avoid endogeneity concerns), and
country-specific fixed effects as exclusion variables.
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The linear projection of uijt on 𝜀ijt is:
uijt = 𝜌2𝜀ijt+eijt. (4)
Now plugging (4) into (1), we obtain:
lxijt = Z1𝛿1+𝛼1laidijt+𝜌2𝜀ijt+eijt. (5)
The two-step procedure consists of first regressing bilat-
eral aid on all the exogenous variables to obtain the re-
duced form residuals ?̂?ijt, and then regressing exports on
a subset of the exogenous variables, bilateral aid and ?̂?ijt.
We use the same two-step procedure for recipient ex-
ports and for donor exports (recipient imports).
The OLS estimate from the second step in (5) is a
control function estimate and gives consistent estimates.
A simple test for the null of exogeneity is a t-statistic on
the statistical significance of ?̂?ijt.
We combine this control function approach with the
use of panel data and three sets of fixed effects. These
are bilateral fixed effects that control for the unobserv-
able heterogeneity attached to each trade flow (ij) and
donor-and-time (it) and recipient-and-time (jt) fixed ef-
fects as controls for MRT, which have to be considered
when estimating theoretically-based gravity models us-
ing panel data.
We use a first-step reduced form regression with aid
as the response variable (based on Equation 3). The re-
duced form is a bilateral aid equation estimated with
country fixed effects. For aid flows, the donor dummies
reflect, in part, the effect of common aid policies that
govern the way in which aid is distributed, while the re-
cipient dummies are proxies for the political and institu-
tional environment in the recipient countries.
Reduced form estimations are presented separately
for donor and recipient exports. Since we are also inter-
ested in the effect of trade policies in combination with
aid policies, we add a number of RTA dummies and the
interaction between RTA variables and aid to the empiri-
cal specification (based on equation 5). For instance, we
show estimates for RTA agreements signed between re-
cipient countries (developing countries) and donors in
the following regions: Asia, America (North and South
America), Africa, Europe and Pacific. The inclusion of in-
teraction terms between the RTA dummies and develop-
ment aid will allow us to investigate the extent to which
trade and aid policies are complementary.
The related literature has recognized the impor-
tance of evaluating the effects of foreign aid on the
trade and economic growth of the recipient countries
(Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2006, 2015). One of the main
issues in such an analysis is the endogeneity of aid in the
trade and growth equations. We tackle this issue as fol-
lows: First, we use the results from the estimations of
bilateral exports (1) from recipient to donor countries
(donor to recipient countries, see Frankel and Romer,
1999) and bilateral aid (3) to obtain the corresponding
residuals. Then, we take the exponential of the residuals
and aggregate themover all donors to obtain an estimate
for each recipient and time period:
resxjt =􏾜
i
Exp(ûijt). (6)
resaidjt =􏾜
i
Exp(?̂?ijt). (7)
Finally, these residuals in natural logs are used in a
second-step estimation in which the dependent vari-
ables are the natural logs of total recipient exports, lxrec,
and the natural log of recipient GDP per capita, lgdppc.
The corresponding specifications are given by equations
(7) and (8):
lxrecjt = 𝛿j+𝛼1laidjt+𝛼2lgdppcjt+𝛼3CPIjt
+𝛼4lxdonjt+𝜌1lresaidjt+𝜌2lresxdjt
+𝜃t+ejt.
(8)
lgdppcjt = 𝛿j+𝛼1laidjt+𝛼2lpopjt+𝛼3lxrecht
+𝛼4lxdonjt+𝜌1lresaidjt+𝜌2lresxdjt
+𝜌3lresxrjt+𝜃j+ejt.
(9)
where l denotes natural logs, aid is bilateral aid, CPI de-
notes the consumer price index, xdon denotes donors’
exports and xrec recipients’ exports, 𝜃t denotes time
fixed effects and 𝛿j denote country fixed effects. Lresxr
and lresxd refer to the log of the aggregated exponential
residuals from the corresponding gravity models for re-
cipients’ exports and donors’ exports according to (6).
The models are also estimated with IV using the
second and third lag of aid commitments as instru-
ments. Moreover, dynamic models that include the
lagged dependent variables are also estimated as a ro-
bustness check.
4. Main Results
A gravity model of trade with bilateral fixed effects and
MRT is used to estimate the effects of bilateral aid on
donor exports and recipient exports. The bilateral fixed
effects control for unobservable country-pair hetero-
geneity as a source of the endogeneity of the aid variable,
and the MRT allow us to estimate a theoretically-based
structural gravitymodel, as described in the previous sec-
tion. The results using this approach are shown in Table 2
for recipient exports and in Table 3 for donor exports.
Regarding the target variable, bilateral aid, results in-
dicates that it has a positive but small significant effect
on recipient exports to donors (Table 2) and on donor ex-
ports to recipients (Table 3). This is also the case when
aid is taken as endogenous in columns (4)–(6). The point
estimate is 0.022 (Table 2, column4) for recipient exports
and 0.026 (Table 3, column 4) for donor exports, indicat-
ing that the effect is stronger for the latter. The estimates
for donor exports are similar to those obtained in Nowak-
Lehmann et al. (2013) for the period 1988 to 2007 using
Dynamic FGLS without MRT, but with leads and lags of
the variables in first differences. Similar estimates were
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Table 2. Gravity results for recipient exports.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln Rec. Exports HDFE HDFE HDFE CF CF CF
Indep. Variables:
Laid 0.0164** 0.0187** 0.0193*** 0.0224** 0.0245*** 0.0252***
[0.00717] [0.00748] [0.00750] [0.00910] [0.00908] [0.00969]
RTA 0.140*** 0.161*** 0.142*** 0.163***
[0.0390] [0.0426] [0.0495] [0.0457]
Laid*RTA −0.0188** −0.0185**
[0.00880] [0.00922]
RTA_Europe 0.113** 0.114**
[0.0495] [0.05411]
RTA_Asia 0.236** 0.238**
[0.106] [0.111]
RTA_Africa 0.571* 0.602*
[0.309] [0.3337]
RTA_America 0.135 0.134
[0.117] [0.123]
RTA_Pacific −0.235 −0.225
[0.258] [0.322]
Laid* Europe −0.0274*** −0.0270***
[0.00955] [0.0101]
Laid*Asia −0.0516** −0.0514**
[0.0235] [0.0253]
Laid*Africa −0.0199 −0.0403
[0.110] [0.123]
Laid*America 0.0640* 0.0647*
[0.0335] [0.0365]
Laid*Pacific −0.0665 −0.0569
[0.199] [0.269]
Residuals from
Bilateral Aid
Equation −0.0157 −0.0153 −0.0156
[0.0112] [0.0114] [0.0117]
BFE, XT, MT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,748 35,748 35,748 37,710 35,710 35,710
R-squared 0.914 0.914 0.914 0.917 0.914 0.914
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets clustered by donor-recipient (default). Method: High-dimensional fixed effects (HDFE) linear
regression. Fixed effects include: donor-year (XT), recipient-year (MT), donor-recipient (BFE). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. CF de-
notes Control Function Approach. All models estimated with the Stata command reghdfe from Correia (2017). Bootstrapped standard
errors in columns 3–6 (1000 replications).
also obtained for donor exports using GMM in a dynamic
setting (as shown in Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2014). In
contrast to Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2013), we also obtain
statistically significant coefficients for recipient exports.
However, only the results concerning donor exports are
robust when a PPML (Poisson pseudo-maximum likeli-
hood) estimator—a technique that tackles several econo-
metric issues, including zero flows, selection bias and
heteroskedasticity—is used (see the results in Tables A.5
and A.6). In the case of recipient exports, bilateral aid
turns out to be non-statistically significant when PPML
is used (Table A.5), in line with previous literature.
We add to the model the average effect of RTAs and
its interaction with bilateral aid in column (2) and the ef-
fects of specific trade agreements and their interactions
with bilateral aid in column (3) of Tables 2 and 3. The re-
sults show that the interaction between the RTA variable
and bilateral aid is negative and statistically significant,
indicating that the positive effect found for the aid vari-
able vanishes for countries that have common RTAs. In
particular, the partial effect of aid on recipient exports
when RTA = 1, calculated using the results in column (2)
of Tables (2) and (3)3, is not statistically significant. There-
fore aid is only statistically significant on average when
3 The marginal effect of aid on trade has been calculated using a test of joint statistical significance (lincom in Stata).
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Table 3. Gravity results for donor exports.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln donor exports HDFE HDFE HDFE CF CF CF
Indep. Variables:
Laid 0.0297*** 0.0338*** 0.0344*** 0.0259*** 0.0296*** 0.0302***
[0.00396] [0.00413] [0.00414] [0.00488] [0.00499] [0.00501]
RTA 0.173*** 0.204*** 0.176*** 0.207***
[0.0242] [0.0257] [0.0242] [0.0258]
Laid*RTA −0.0329*** −0.0335***
[0.00493] [0.00494]
RTA_Europe 0.218*** 0.222***
[0.0307] [0.0307]
RTA_Asia 0.0801 0.0803
[0.0797] [0.0797]
RTA_Africa 0.244 0.248
[0.183] [0.186]
RTA_America 0.121*** 0.121***
[0.0453] [0.0453]
RTA_Pacific −0.903*** −0.905***
[0.242] [0.241]
Laid*Europe −0.0409*** −0.0414***
[0.00551] [0.00551]
Laid*Asia 0.0271 0.0272
[0.0190] [0.0190]
Laid*Africa 0.0307 0.0276
[0.0825] [0.0844]
Laid*America −0.0276** −0.0283**
[0.0118] [0.0118]
Laid*Pacific −0.695*** −0.699***
[0.188] [0.188]
Residuals from
Bilateral Aid
Equation 0.0101* 0.0110* 0.0111*
[0.00610] [0.00610] [0.00610]
Observations 37,356 37,356 37,356 37,314 37,314 37,314
R-squared 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets clustered by donor-recipient (default). Method: High-dimensional fixed effects (HDFE) linear
regression. Fixed effects include: donor-year, recipient-year, donor-recipient. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. CF denotes Con-
trol Function Approach. All models estimated with the Stata command reghdfe from Correia (2017). Bootstrapped standard errors in
columns 3–6 (1000 replications).
there are no RTAs between the donor and the recipient
country. The estimated coefficient for pairs of countries
without RTAs indicates that a 10 percent increase in bi-
lateral aid raises recipient exports by about 0.24 percent
(column 5, Table 2), whereas for donor exports the cor-
responding effect is around 0.3 percent (column 5, Ta-
ble 3). Moreover, the coefficient estimated for the RTA
variable indicates that RTAs increase exports by around
17 percent4 for recipients and by 22 percent for donors
for country pairs without aid link. These effects decrease
with the amount of aid given, as indicated by the nega-
tive effect of the interaction variable (Laid * RTA).
Results in column (3) of both tables show that the
effect is heterogeneous and varies by agreement. For in-
stance, the bilateral RTAs signed mostly between the EU
and EFTA (Europe) and recipient countries have a posi-
tive and significant effect on recipient exports—and also
on donor exports—but this effect decreases with the
amount of aid given. This is also the case for RTAs in Asia
(see Table A.4 for a list of agreements included). In terms
of the RTAs signed by American countries, they seem to
exert a statistically significant effect on donor exports
only, and this effect also decreases with the amount of
aid given. For the agreement involving the Pacific region
(Australia–Singapore and TPP: Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement), no significant effect of the RTAs on recipi-
ent exports is found, whereas the effect is negative and
significant for donor exports.
4 The effect is calculated as Exp(0.163 − 1)*100 using the coefficient of the RTA variable in column (5) of Table 2.
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Next, we estimate the effect of aid on aggregate re-
cipient exports and on income per capita in the recip-
ient countries by using the control function approach
and alternative IV methods. The main results are pre-
sented in Tables 4 (for exports) and 5 (for income). Col-
umn (1) shows the FE results and column (2) the results
of the control function approach, when the aggregated
residuals from the first step estimations of bilateral aid
and bilateral exports are added as regressors. In columns
(3)–(4), the models are estimated using IV for aid, while
column (5) presents the results of a dynamic model that
uses IV for aid and for the lagged dependent variable.
The results in Table 4 indicate that greater amounts
of aid received and more imports from all donors lead
to an increase in recipient exports, given that significant
and positive effects are shown for foreign aid and for
donors’ exports. In particular, a 10 percent increase in
ODA raises recipient exports by around 0.6 percentwhen
using the control function approach, and the point esti-
mate increases to 1.6 when using IV; however, the effect
is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level. In
addition, for each 10 percent increase in donor exports,
recipient exports increase by around 2.6 percent (col-
umn 2, Table 4). These results are robust to the addition
of control variables (column4) and the laggeddependent
variable (column 5) to the model. The long-run effects in
column (5) can be calculated by dividing the point coeffi-
cients by (1–0.77), with 0.77 being the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable. Tests for the validity of the
instruments are included in the last two rows of Table 4.
The Hansen test indicates that we cannot reject the valid-
ity of the instruments and the Kleibergen-Paap statistic
indicates that the instruments are not weak.
Column (1) in Table 5 shows the effect of trade on
the recipient’s income per capita. A one percent increase
in exports from recipients to donors raises the income
per capita in the recipient country by around 0.12 per-
cent. Moreover, the same increase in donors’ exports
increases that income level by around 0.2 percent. As
in other studies (Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2013), the aid
coefficient is not statistically significant in Table 5. How-
ever, aid is found to exert an indirect effect on income
through trade, given that aggregate aid and imports from
the donors are associated with higher recipient exports
(Table 4), and higher recipient exports have a positive
effect on income (Table 5). The estimated coefficients
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 are robust to changes
in the specification and to the addition to a number of
control variables. In particular, column (3) presents the
results when population, foreign direct investment, re-
mittances, and gross capital formation are added to the
model; the main difference is the reduction in the coeffi-
Table 4. Regression results for aggregate recipient exports.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Rec. Exports of
Goods and Services CTFE CTFE-CF CTFE-IV CTFE-IV IV-Dyn
Indep. Variables:
Lgdppc 1.049*** 1.041*** 1.115*** 1.113*** 0.218**
[0.118] [0.121] [0.130] [0.138] [0.0877]
Laid_Total 0.0652** 0.0693** 0.157* 0.156* 0.0458**
[0.0319] [0.0327] [0.0807] [0.0860] [0.0219]
Lxdon_Total 0.246*** 0.257*** 0.191*** 0.198*** 0.0414*
[0.0807] [0.0826] [0.0698] [0.0707] [0.0238]
CPI −8.73e-06*** −8.56e-06*** −6.56e-06***
[2.32e-06] [2.58e-06] [9.85e-07]
Lresaid_s −0.00101 0.00187
[0.0175] [0.0166]
Lresxd_s −0.0254 −0.0248
[0.0372] [0.0354]
Lxrec (T-1) 0.771***
[0.0432]
Observations 1,785 1,666 1,762 1,646 1,388
R-squared 0.693 0.696 0.683 0.687 0.911
Number of countries 115 108 100 96 93
Hansen st. (prob.) 0.448 0.430 0.545
Kleibergen-Paap st. 	18.34 15.71 18.34
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. CFE denotes country fixed effects, CTFE denotes coun-
try and time fixed effects, CF Control Function Approach and IV instrumental variables. The definition of the variables can be found in
Table A2 and lresaid_s and lresxd_s are obtained from the estimated residuals of the aid and the donors’ exports models, respectively.
Hansen st. (prob.) is the probability associated to the Hansen test, which indicate that we cannot reject the validity of the instruments.
Kleibergen-Paap statistic is a test for weak instruments, which result indicates that the instruments are not weak.
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Table 5. Regression results for recipient income per capita.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lgdppc CTFE CTFE-CF CTFE_CF CTFE-IV CTFE-IV IV-Dyn
Indep. Variables:
Laid_Total −0.0165 −0.0145 −0.00436 0.00130 0.0261 0.00646
[0.0144] [0.0156] [0.0106] [0.0323] [0.0218] [0.00694]
Lxrec_Total 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.0939*** 0.121*** 0.108*** 0.0285***
[0.0291] [0.0289] [0.0331] [0.0301] [0.0333] [0.00491]
Lxdon_Total 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.0855*** 0.223*** 0.0782*** 0.0176*
[0.0422] [0.0424] [0.0286] [0.0362] [0.0288] [0.0106]
Lpop −0.911*** −0.960*** −0.245***
[0.129] [0.142] [0.0293]
Lfdi 0.00168 0.00210
[0.00469] [0.00449]
Lrem 0.00183 0.00223
[0.00876] [0.00872]
Lgcf 0.110*** 0.120*** 0.0372***
[0.0283] [0.0274] [0.00811]
Lresaid_s 0.00485 0.00879
[0.0105] [0.00599]
Lresxr_s −0.0135 0.000895
[0.0106] [0.00662]
Lresxd_s −0.0452** −0.0239
[0.0196] [0.0144]
Lgdppc(T-1) 0.799***
[0.0168]
Observations 2,248 2,241 1,447 2,235 1,438 1,697
R-squared 0.667 0.670 0.843 0.663 0.836 0.961
Number of countries 126 121 100 122 96 110
Hansen st. (prob.) 0.283 0.0239 0.793
Kleibergen-Paap st. 	 	 	 19.39 12.54 20.59
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. CFE denotes country fixed effects, CTFE denotes country
and time fixed effects, CF Control Function Approach and IV instrumental variables. The definition of the variables can be found in Table A2.
lresaid_s, lresxr_s and lresxd_s are obtained from the estimated residuals of the aid, the recipients’ exports and the donors’ exports mod-
els, respectively. Hansen st. (prob.) is the probability associated to the Hansen test, which indicate that we cannot reject the validity of
the instruments. Kleibergen-Paap statistic is a test for weak instruments, which result indicates that the instruments are not weak.
cient of donor exports, which is in part due to the smaller
sample of countries for which data are available (121 in
column 2 compared to 100 in column 3). In columns (4)
and (5), the aid variable is instrumented with the first
and second lag of aggregate aid commitments and the re-
sults remain similar to those in columns (2) and (3) using
the control function approach. Finally, in column (5), the
lagged dependent variable of income per capita is added
to the model to incorporate dynamics. The coefficient of
the lagged income variable is positive and significant, as
expected, and the results for recipient exports and donor
exports remain positive and significant: the long-run ef-
fects are 0.14 and 0.08 for each one percent increase in
recipient and donor exports, respectively. As in Table 4,
the last two rows of Table 5 include tests for the validity
of the instruments and for weak instruments.
The control function approach allows us to test for the
endogeneity of aid and trade variables in the recipient ex-
ports and income equations estimated in Tables 4 and 5.
The corresponding t-tests on the residuals from the first-
step equations (for exports and for development aid) in-
dicate that the coefficients of the residuals are generally
not statistically significant when the model is estimated
with country and time fixed effects, suggesting that the
use of panel data mitigates potential endogeneity.
5. Robustness Checks
As a first robustness check,we have estimated the gravity
models for recipient exports and imports using the usual
gravity controls; namely, income in the trading countries
and dummy variables for common language, common
border, colonial relationship and belonging to the same
country in the past. The results are shown in Table A.7.
In general, the aid coefficient is positive and significant,
and higher in magnitude than in the main results. This is
as expected since the models in Table A.7 do not control
for time-variant MRT, nor for all the bilateral unobserved
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heterogeneity in the gravity model.
We have also run separate models for different re-
gions. Using the World Bank classification, we divide the
world into regions as indicated in Table A.8. The results
for recipient exports shown in column (1) indicate that it
is mainly aid sent to the Latin American and Caribbean
region and to South Asian countries that has been ef-
fective in increasing recipient exports. Concerning donor
exports, the results are shown in column (2) and indi-
cate that aid to East Asia & Pacific, to Europe & Central
Asia, to South Asia, and to Sub-Saharan Africa increase
exports, whereas the aid coefficient for Latin America &
Caribbean and Middle East & North Africa is not statisti-
cally significant.
The income per capita model was also estimated in
first differenceswith IV to avoid potential issueswith spu-
rious correlations, and the results hold (see Table A.9). Fi-
nally, themodelwas also estimated for several lags of the
aggregate aid variable and the results indicate that the
aidwas statistically significant in the incomemodel when
using the fifth lag as regressor and the sixth-to-tenth lags
as instruments. This is in line with recent reviews of the
aid-growth literature (Table A.10).
6. Conclusion
This article reviews the recent literature on the bilat-
eral trade and aid link that uses the gravity model as
the main analytical framework. Existing studies find a ro-
bust positive effect of bilateral aid on bilateral exports
from donor to recipient countries. The findings also indi-
cate that there is a small but non-robust effect of bilat-
eral aid on recipient exports. The claim for causality run-
ning from aid to exports is supported by use of methods
that account for the endogeneity of aid in the bilateral
trade equation.
This article confirms the abovementioned findings
and adds trade policy variables, specifically RTA dummy
variables, to the main setting. It has been argued that in
some cases, donors will seek to combine closer trade re-
lations with more aid, whereas in other cases, aid and
trade regional policies are unrelated. The results of this
article support the view that donors give aid to countries
with which they have weak trade links with the aim of
establishing closer relations.
Finally, when studying the effect of total aid on total
recipient exports and GDP per capita, we find that the ef-
fect of aid on recipient exports is statistically significant
and that aggregate exports and imports seems to have a
positive and significant effect on the GDP per capita of
the recipient countries. Hence, the part of trade that has
been incentivized by foreign aid appears to foster eco-
nomic development.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Overview of studies on the effects of ODA on donor exports.
Authors Countries Period Method Export/aid Average $-
Elasticity return per
$1 Aid
Nilsson (1997) EU-15 donors to 108 recipients 1975–1992 OLS 0.230 sr 2.6
Wagner (2003) 20 donors to 109 recipients 1970–1992 Bilateral 0.062 sr .35 direct
FE/NLS .95 indirect
Zarin-Nejadan, Switzerland to almost 1966–2003 Country 0.044 sr .84–.96
Monteiro and 100 recipients FE/FD OLS (Swiss Fr.)
Noormamode (2008)
Martínez-Zarzoso, Germany to 138 recipients 1962–2007 Bilateral 0.051 sr 0.64
Nowak-Lehmann, FE/Sys-GMM 0.220 lr 1.10–1.52
Klasen and
Larch (2009)
Nowak-Lehmann, Germany to 77 recipients 1962–2007 DOLS/DGLS 0.090 lr 1.04–1.50
Martínez-Zarzoso,
Klasen and
Herzer (2009)
Silva and Nelson Bilateral exports between 1962–2000 Bilateral FE 0.094 sr Not
(2012) 180 countries Neg. multil. comparable
effect
Pettersson and Exports among 1990–2005 OLS /HMR 0.09 sr Not
Johansson (2013) 180 countries Country FE comparable
Martínez-Zarzoso, Germany to 132 recipients 1988–2009 Bilateral Sectoral —
Nowak-Lehmann, (sectoral exports) FE/DOLS Elast.
Klasen and 0.06 lr
Johannsen (2016)
Hansen and Rand Denmark to 144 recipients 1981–2010 Bilateral 0.059 sr 0.30
(2014) FE/GMM 0.057 lr
Martínez-Zarzoso, The Netherlands to 1973–2009 Bilateral 0.06 sr 0.29 sr
Nowak-Lehmann 130 recipients FE/GMM/DOLS 0.10 lr 0.84 lr
and Klasen (2017)
Martínez-Zarzoso, DAC donors to 1988–2007 Bilateral 0.04 sr 0.50 sr
Nowak-Lehmann 130 recipients FE/Sys-GMM 0.12 lr* 1.80 lr
and Klasen (2014)
Martínez-Zarzoso 22 donors to 132 recipients 1988–2007 Control 0.052 sr —
(2015) Function
Approach
Otor (2017) Japan to 15 Asian countries 1972–2008 DOLS 1.30–1.50 sr
1.41–2.62 lr
Temple and Net imports for 88 1971–2012 FE and CCE Aid/GDP Not
Van de Sijpe (2017) aid recipients three-year increase net comparable
averages donor exports
Liu and Tang (2018) USA and China to 26 2003–2012 FE/Dif-GMM US ns China
and 30 African countries FE/0.06sr
Notes: See Zarin et al (2008) for studies in the 1990s and for studies on time-series bivariate models. NLS denotes non-linear least
squares. FE denotes fixed effects, Sys-GMM denotes System Generalized Method of Moments, DOLS/DGLS denotes dynamic OLS and
dynamic generalized least squares. SR denotes short run (from a static model) and LR long run estimates (from a dynamic model). HMR
denotes Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). *Calculated as an average of the LR coefficients of three periods.
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Table A.2. List of variables, definitions and sources.
Variable Variable description Source
Aid Bilateral Official Development Aid net disbursements in current USD OECD
Aidcom Bilateral Official Development Aid commitments in current USD OECD
Xrec Donor imports from the recipient in current USD UNCTAD
Xdon Recipient imports from the donor in current USD UNCTAD
GDP_don GDP of reporter country in current USD WDI
GDP_rec GDP of partner country in current USD WDI
Pop_don Population of reporter country in millions of inhabitants WDI
Pop_rec Population of partner country in millions of inhabitants WDI
Dist The distance in kilometers between the capital cities of reporter i and partner j CEPII
Landlock Variable that takes the value of 1 if the reporter country is landlocked (meaning CEPII
that it does not have access to a sea or coastline), 2 if the partner country is
also landlocked, and 0 otherwise
Comcol Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the countries have ever had a colonial CEPII
relationship, and 0 otherwise
Border Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the reporter country i and partner CEPII
country j share a common border and 0 otherwise
Lang Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the trading countries have a common CEPII
official language, and 0 otherwise
Smctry Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if both countries were part of the same CEPII
country in the past and 0 otherwise
Comcur Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the countries have a common currency, De Sousa (2012)
and 0 otherwise
RTA Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the countries belong to the same free De Sousa (2012)
trade agreement, and 0 otherwise and WTO
WTO Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the countries are WTO members and WTO
0 otherwise
Gkf Gross Capital Formation in current USD WDI
Lgdppc Recipient GDP per capita in 2011 constant USD WDI
CPI Consumer price index WDI
Exp_gs Exports of goods and services in current USD WDI
Fdi Foreign direct investment in current USD WDI
Rem Remittances in current USD WDI
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Table A.3. List of countries.
Donors Recipients
Australia Afghanistan Gabon Pakistan
Austria Albania Gambia Palau
Belgium Algeria Georgia Panama
Canada Angola Ghana Papua New Guinea
Czech Republic Antigua and Barbuda Guatemala Paraguay
Denmark Argentina Guinea Peru
Estonia Armenia Guinea-Bissau Philippines
Finland Azerbaijan Guyana Rwanda
France Bahrain Haiti Samoa
Germany Bangladesh Honduras Sao Tome and Principe
Greece Belarus Indonesia Saudi Arabia
Hungary Belize Iraq Senegal
Iceland Benin Israel Seychelles
Ireland Bhutan Jamaica Sierra Leone
Israel Bolivia Jordan Slovenia
Italy Bosnia and Herzegovina Kazakhstan Solomon Islands
Japan Botswana Kenya Somalia
Kuwait Brazil Kiribati South Africa
Lithuania Burkina Faso Kyrgyzstan Sri Lanka
Luxembourg Burundi Lebanon Sudan
Netherlands Cambodia Lesotho Suriname
New Zealand Cameroon Liberia Swaziland
Norway Central African Republic Libya Syrian Arab Republic
Poland Chad Madagascar Tajikistan
Portugal Chile Malawi Thailand
Slovenia Colombia Malaysia Togo
Spain Comoros Maldives Tonga
Sweden Congo Mali Tunisia
Switzerland Costa Rica Malta Turkey
Turkey Croatia Mauritania Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirates Cuba Mauritius Tuvalu
United Kingdom Cyprus Mexico Uganda
United States Djibouti Mongolia Ukraine
Dominica Morocco Uruguay
Dominican Republic Mozambique Uzbekistan
Ecuador Myanmar Vanuatu
Egypt Namibia Venezuela
El Salvador Nepal Viet Nam
Equatorial Guinea Nicaragua Yemen
Eritrea Niger Zambia
Ethiopia Nigeria Zimbabwe
Fiji Oman
Source: OECD-DAC.
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Table A.4. List of free trade agreements.
Europe Asia America
EU-South Africa ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Canada-Chile
EU-Albania ASEAN-Japan Canada-Colombia
EU-Bosnia Japan-Indonesia Canada-Costa Rica
Turkey-Bosnia&Herz. Japan-Malaysia Canada-Honduras
EU-Slovenia Japan-Peru Canada-Jordan
EU-Chile Japan-Philippines Canada-Panama
EU-Cameroon Japan-Vietnam Canada-Peru
EU-Colombia Malaysia-Australia Chile-Australia
Croatia-Turkey Malaysia-New Zealand Chile-Japan
EU-Algeria Thailand-Japan Mexico-Chile
EFTA-Albania Thailand- Australia Mexico-Japan
EFTA-Bosnia&Herz. Thailand-New Zealand US-Mex-Can
EFTA-Chile US-Chile
EFTA-Colombia Africa US-Colombia
EFTA-Costa Rica Egypt-Turkey USA-Israel
EFTA-Colombia Morocco-Turley US-Jordan
EFTA-Egypt South Africa CU US-Morocco
EFTA-Israel Syria-Turkey US-Oman
EFTA-Jordan Tunisia-Turkey US-Panama
EFTA-Libya US-Peru
EFTA-Morocco USA-CAFTA-Dominican Republic
EFTA-Mexico
EFTA-Panama Pacific
EFTA-Peru Australia-Singapore
EFTA-Tunisia Trans-Pacific EPA
EFTA-Turkey
EFTA-Ukraine
EU-Egypt
EU-East Africa
EU-Canada
EU-Fiji
EU-Georgia
EU-Jordan
EU-Libya
EU-Morocco
EU-Mexico
EU-Peru
EU-Singapore
EU-Syria
EU-Tunisia
EU-Turkey
Turkey-Israel
EU-Ukraine
EU-CARIFORUM
Source: WTO.
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Table A.5. PPML estimates for recipient exports.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rec. Exports
(levels) HDFE HDFE HDFE CF CF CF
Indep. Variables:
Laid 0.00720 0.00996 0.00834 0.00748 0.0112 0.00907
[0.00713] [0.00787] [0.00776] [0.00904] [0.0101] [0.0100]
RTA −0.000415 0.0355 0.0196 0.0601
[0.0499] [0.0548] [0.0449] [0.0568]
Laid*RTA −0.0118 −0.0216
[0.0135] [0.0158]
RTA_Europe 0.0217 0.0223
[0.0727] [0.0809]
RTA_Asia 0.444*** 0.306***
[0.122] [0.0923]
RTA_Africa −0.398*** −0.263**
[0.154] [0.132]
RTA_America 0.0727 0.111
[0.0972] [0.102]
RTA_Pacific 0.0400 −0.0381
[0.292] [0.317]
Laid*Europe 0.00927 0.00615
[0.0145] [0.0211]
Laid*Asia −0.125*** −0.108***
[0.0300] [0.0276]
Laid*Africa 0.0923 0.0108
[0.110] [0.0909]
Laid*America 0.0119 −0.000121
[0.0252] [0.0254]
Laid*Pacific −0.213 −0.142
[0.257] [0.217]
Residuals from
Bilateral Aid
Equation 0.00672 0.00692 0.00733
[0.00735] [0.00725] [0.00719]
Observations 36,089 36,089 36,089 36,051 36,051 36,051
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.997
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Method: PPML for structural gravity with high-dimensional fixed effects (HDFE). FE included: donor-
year, recipient-year, donor-recipient. Clustered standard errors, clustered by donor-recipient (default). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05. CF de-
notes Control Function Approach. The definition of the variables can be found in Table A2.
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Table A.6. PPML estimates for donor exports.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donor Exports
(levels) HDFE HDFE HDFE CF CF CF
Indep. Variables:
Laid 0.00916** 0.0187*** 0.0201*** 0.00447 0.0182*** 0.0211***
[0.00453] [0.00511] [0.00500] [0.00601] [0.00614] [0.00584]
RTA 0.171*** 0.250*** 0.181*** 0.253***
[0.0322] [0.0355] [0.0367] [0.0377]
Laid*RTA −0.0270*** −0.0293***
[0.00721] [0.00843]
RTA_Europe 0.168*** 0.179***
[0.0364] [0.0377]
RTA_Asia 0.447*** 0.315***
[0.115] [0.116]
RTA_Africa −0.00941 −0.0742
[0.156] [0.151]
RTA_America 0.429*** 0.470***
[0.0513] [0.0551]
RTA_Pacific −0.391** −0.682***
[0.163] [0.191]
Laid*Europe −0.0234*** −0.0277***
[0.00693] [0.00857]
Laid*Asia −0.0681** −0.0425*
[0.0266] [0.0248]
Laid*Africa −0.0974 −0.0658
[0.0830] [0.0606]
Laid*America −0.0455*** −0.0598***
[0.0142] [0.0146]
Laid*Pacific −0.334** −0.412***
[0.143] [0.115]
Residuals from
Bilateral Aid
Equation 0.00948* 0.00949* 0.00992**
[0.00488] [0.00498] [0.00482]
Observations 37,879 37,879 37,879 37,837 37,837 37,837
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.999
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Method: PPML for structural gravity with high-dimensional fixed effects (HDFE). FE included: donor-
year, recipient-year, donor-recipient. Clustered standard errors, clustered by donor-recipient (default). *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
CF denotes Control Function Approach. The definition of the variables can be found in Table A2.
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Table A.7. Gravity model with additional controls.
Recipient exports Donor exports
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Exports OLS-TFE OLS-TCFE OLS-TFE OLS-TCFE
Ind. Variables:
Lgdp_rec 1.206*** 0.778*** 0.967*** 0.822***
[0.0329] [0.117] [0.0157] [0.0370]
Lgdp_don 1.229*** 0.685*** 0.925*** 0.0416
[0.0231] [0.0775] [0.0218] [0.0717]
Laid 0.0330** 0.106*** 0.118*** 0.159***
[0.0161] [0.0140] [0.00967] [0.00928]
RTA 0.386*** 0.240*** 0.363*** 0.183***
[0.0886] [0.0770] [0.0535] [0.0459]
Laidrta 0.0268 −0.0211 −0.0104 −0.0556***
[0.0294] [0.0227] [0.0172] [0.0139]
WTO 0.329*** 0.206** 0.0875 0.0966*
[0.0990] [0.0838] [0.0541] [0.0529]
Comcur 1.279** −0.270 1.130 0.328
[0.604] [0.474] [1.057] [0.554]
Ldist −0.728*** −1.481*** −0.988*** −1.396***
[0.0585] [0.0803] [0.0378] [0.0515]
Landlock −0.618*** −0.387***
[0.0764] [0.0469]
Lang 0.670*** 0.479*** 0.513*** 0.421***
[0.112] [0.102] [0.0711] [0.0665]
Comcol 1.009*** −0.0278 0.690*** 0.265
[0.266] [0.266] [0.223] [0.206]
Border 0.932** 0.255 0.533 0.289
[0.443] [0.466] [0.442] [0.581]
Smctry 2.280*** 1.094** 0.906*** 0.760*
[0.414] [0.431] [0.325] [0.443]
Observations 33,253 33,253 35,052 35,052
R-squared 0.628 0.757 0.767 0.844
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. TFE denotes time fixed effects. TCFE denotes time and
country fixed effects. The definition of the variables can be found in Table A2.
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Table A.8. Regional specific coefficients for aid.
(1) (2)
Dep. variable: Ln Recipient Exports Ln Donor Exports
Indep. Variables:
Laid_EAP 0.0233 0.0328**
[0.0161] [0.0142]
Laid_ECA 0.0333 0.0398***
[0.0211] [0.0119]
Laid_LAC 0.0436*** 0.00816
[0.0111] [0.00662]
Laid_MENA 0.00976 0.0123
[0.0208] [0.00925]
Laid_SAS 0.0699*** 0.0399**
[0.0215] [0.0159]
Laid_SSA 0.0135 0.0404***
[0.0134] [0.00721]
RTA 0.162*** 0.201***
[0.0429] [0.0256]
Laid*RTA −0.0173* −0.0295***
[0.00945] [0.00510]
Residuals from
Bilateral Aid
Equation −0.0164 0.0120**
[0.0110] [0.00607]
Observations 35,710 37,314
R-squared 0.914 0.952
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets clustered by donor-recipient (default). Method: High-dimensional fixed effects (HDFE) linear
regression. Fixed effects include: donor-year, recipient-year, donor-recipient. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05. Control Function Approach. All
models estimated with the Stata command reghdfe from Correia (2017). Bootstrapped standard errors in columns (1000 replications).
EAP = East Asia & Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America & Caribbean; MENA = Middle East & North Africa;
SAS = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. The definition of the variables can be found in Table A2.
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Table A.9. Income per capita model in first differences.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3)
D.lgdppc CTFE-IV CTFE-IV IV-Dyn
Indep. Variables:
D.laid_total −0.0540 −0.00860 −0.000816
[0.0381] [0.0205] [0.00279]
D.lxrec_total 0.0408*** 0.0203*** 0.0232***
[0.00953] [0.00778] [0.00814]
D.lxdon_total 0.0905*** 0.0716*** 0.0526***
[0.0149] [0.0130] [0.0128]
D.lpop −0.648*** −0.429***
[0.131] [0.0612]
D.lfdi 0.00233** 0.00115
[0.00106] [0.000934]
D.lrem 0.000573 0.00282
[0.00246] [0.00213]
LD.lgdppc 0.649***
[0.0560]
Observations 2,112 1,659 1,441
R-squared 0.054 0.227 0.273
Number of countries 122 115 112
Hansen st. (prob.) 0.358 0.294 0.403
Kleibergen-Paap st. 5.850 3.119 21.24
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05. CTFE denotes country and time fixed effects, IV denotes instrumental
variables and Dyn dynamic model. D. denotes variables in first differences. Hansen st. (prob.) is the probability associated to the Hansen
test, which indicate that we cannot reject the validity of the instruments. Kleibergen-Paap statistic is a test for weak instruments, which
result indicates that the instruments are not weak. The definition of the variables can be found in Table A2.
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Table A.10. Income per capita model with aid in previous periods.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2)
Lgdppc CTFE_CF CTFE-IV
Indep. Variables:
Laid_total(t-5) 0.0158** 0.0252***
[0.00642] [0.00963]
Laid_total(t-10) 0.0173*
[0.00939]
Lxrec_total 0.105*** 0.0965***
[0.0221] [0.0206]
Lxdon_total 0.129*** 0.134***
[0.0465] [0.0391]
Lpop −0.792*** −0.811***
[0.120] [0.109]
Lfdi −0.00488 −0.00208
[0.00508] [0.00459]
Lgcf 0.0693*** 0.0677***
[0.0213] [0.0200]
Lresaid_s −0.00725
[0.00610]
Lresxr_s −0.00876
[0.00848]
Lresxd_s −0.0301
[0.0187]
Observations 1,541 1,538
R-squared 0.746 0.738
Number of countries 109 106
Hansen st. (prob.) . 0.314
Kleibergen-Paap st. . 30.52
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. CTFE denotes country and time fixed effects, CF denotes
control function approach, IV denotes instrumental variables and Dyn dynamic model. Hansen st. (prob.) is the probability associated
to the Hansen test, which indicate that we cannot reject the validity of the instruments. Kleibergen-Paap statistic is a test for weak
instruments, which result indicates that the instruments are not weak. The definition of the variables can be found in Table A2. lresaid_s,
lresxr_s and lresxd_s are obtained from the estimated residuals of the aid, the recipients’ exports and the donors’ exports models,
respectively.
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